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Abstract. Moving from some reflections on the empirical practice of measurement
and on the nature of visual perception, we present a constructivist approach to ob-
jects. At the basis of such approach there is the idea that all we may know about
what is out there is always mediated by some sort of apparatus, being it a mea-
surement instrument or our perceptual system. Given this perspective, some ques-
tions are in order: how are objects identified and re-identified through time from
the outcomes of apparatuses? How can we distinguish different (kinds of) objects?
Our first goal will be to make explicit the mechanism used to build objects from
the apparatuses’ outcomes, emphasizing what are the ontological and representa-
tional problems this construction faces. A second contribution will be a prelimi-
nary discussion of some possible ways to distinguish social objects, the constructed
objects par excellence, from physical ones. A third contribution will be an attempt
to make a bridge between two scientific communities that rarely seek contact or
mutual recognition: that of formal ontologies and that of formal concept analysis.
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The suspicion that the world, or, if you prefer, reality, or, simply, what is ‘out there’, is
not how it appears to be, is not just philosophical or fictional; it is something deeper, a
doubt that we had at least once in our life. The Matrix movie can be seen as the popular
version of Arthur Schopenauer’s Veil of Maya: our eyes are clouded by illusion (maya)
that does not allow us to see objects in themselves. The mere possibility that objects
could mysteriously appear to us only through the veil, is enough to bring us into an
uncomfortable state of incertitude about what exists out there.
Tearing this veil away, showing reality as it is, is a goal shared by many scientists.
In this enterprise, sciences—physical sciences, in primis, but also psychological and so-
cial sciences—ascribe a central role to measurement. The monumental work of Krantz,
Luce, Suppes & Tversky [9] seems to dispel any doubt on the level of understanding and
agreement sciences have reached about measurement. However, according to Kyburg Jr
[11] the majority of the literature on measurement is concerned with specific techni-
cal problems that regard the construction of numerical structures representing given at-
tributes (governed by some axioms). Less attention has been devoted to, and less agree-
ment achieved on, foundational aspects of measurement, e.g. induction (of the governing
axioms) and scientific inference, or realist vs. operationalist (conventionalist) view on
measures. The latter debate is of interest for us, however we will not enter into it here.
Rather, we will show that a constructivist position on objects, the acceptance of the veil,
could dissolve some mysteries, enlighten some classical problems by forcing the emer-
gence of hypotheses that often remain implicit in the empirical practice of measurement.
From an empirical point of view, measurement can be seen as “a physical interac-
tion, set up by agents, in a way that allows them to gather information. The outcome
of a measurement provides a representation of the entity (object, event, process) mea-
sured, selectively, by displaying values of some physical parameters that—according to
the theory governing this context—characterize that object” ([25], p.179). On the basis
of the measures, objects1 are placed in a (structured) space of possible states that allows
their classification and comparison. In this perspective, the out there is mediated by ap-
paratuses: the observer has direct access only to the measurement outcome2, not to the
input of the sensor, “physics has nothing to say about a possible real world lying behind
experience (...) the task of physics as of all science is found in the coherent description of
experience” ([12], p.2). A whole new world, a world of ‘public hallucinations’ emerges:
“the microscope need not be thought of as a window, but is most certainly an engine
creating new optical phenomena. It is accurate to say of what we see in the microscope
that we are “seeing an image” (...) that could be either a copy of a real thing not visible to
the naked eye or a mere public hallucination” ([25], p.109).3 Analogously, studies in the
cognitive sciences show that the link between our sensations and the out there is far from
obvious: “the visual system does not have direct access to facts about the environment;
it has access only to facts about the image projected onto the retina. That is, an organism
cannot be presumed to know how the environment is structured except through sensory
information. (...) The confusion that underlies the experience error is typically to suppose
that the starting point for vision is the distal stimulus rather than the proximal stimulus
(...) the structure of the environment is more accurately regarded as the result of visual
perception rather than its starting point” ([15], p.191). But, why does the perceptual sys-
tem organize perceptual information in a certain way rather than another? Why do sci-
entists rely on specific apparatuses to discover the out there? Palmer [15] argues that,
in the case of perception, one could appeal to evolutionary reasons: certain organization
patterns establish a sort of coordination with the environment that makes possible the
organisms’ survival. Scientific apparatuses and measurement procedures develop hand
in hand with a theoretical framework and they aim at “the reliability of the predictions
concerning these [procedures] and their correlation with other measurement procedures
derived from the mature theory in which they are theoretically embedded.” ([25], p.124).
Following these ideas, in order to ‘know’ the out there, the observer must begin
from the apparatuses’ outcomes, the public hallucinations, the sensations, the proximal
stimuli. This is also our starting point. In [13], extending the empirical measurement
theory [6], we showed that ascribing a central role to instruments and their description,
the empirical attribution of properties to objects at a given time—the classification of
objects at a time—can attain an inter-subjective dimension—via calibration of instru-
ments and conventional standards of measurement—without presupposing an objective
reality. Here we want to explore a more radical position. A position that, differently from
the formal theories on measurement we are aware of, does not presuppose the a priori
identification of objects under-measurement.4 We want to move the observer ‘inside’ the
instrument. From the inside, the observer does not see what the instrument is connected
to, “gauges do not supply (...) information about these external connections (...) [about]
1In the following we will concentrate on objects even though the framework can be extended to take into
account events, processes, etc.
2We assume that the internal states of the apparatuses are empirically discernible without errors.
3van Fraassen is making a stronger point here: in some cases, the instruments of measure produce the
phenomena that sciences use to make sense of what is out there.
4Actually, also [10,16]—two approaches concerned with the ontological foundations of observation and
measurement in a constructivist context—do not explicitly consider where objects come from.
which tire (if any) the gauge represents” ([3], p.23). Furthermore, an apparatus does not
necessarily interact with one ‘single’ object; for instance, a camera collects information
about whatever is in front of the lens.5 Such a radical position raises some questions.
How are objects (under measurement) identified and re-identified through time from
the outcomes of apparatuses? How are different (kinds of) objects distinguished? These
questions are not new in physical sciences: “by what principles shall we select certain
data from the chaos, and call them all appearances of the same thing?” ([20], p.86). Sim-
ilar questions are considered in cognitive science. How is vision able to structure the
receptors’ outputs, e.g. luminance and color of retinal positions, in meaningful surfaces,
objects, or groups and track them across time [17,15]?
As observed by Pylyshyn [17], these questions bring the observer into a vicious cir-
cle. To decide in virtue of what ‘that’ is an object of a certain kind, one needs to refer
to some properties, e.g. the mass or the spatio-temporal trajectories. To define what it
means to have these properties one needs to refer to other properties, etc. Similarly, to
understand which is the tire the gauge is connected to, one needs additional information
whose collection must rely on a second apparatus. But to understand that the second ap-
paratus is connected to both the gauge and the tire, one needs a third apparatus, etc. To
avoid the vicious circle, the recursion needs to stop somewhere. Pylyshyn hypothesizes
that, to pick up and track objects, our perceptive system relies on a non conceptual mech-
anism. This mechanism is not a classification system, one does not know what (what
kind of objects) is selected, even though one knows which object it is, but this is enough
to have the possibility to attribute properties to ‘that’. Matthen [14] considers an auto-
calibration process founded on our ability to predict (in an inductive way) the behavior
of the environment. The authors support their answers with experimental results which
we don’t have the competences and the space to evaluate. However, these answers are
not very satisfactory from the point of view of measurement. First of all, measurement
apparatuses don’t have the ‘innate’ ability of carving-up the world into objects (and prop-
erties). Outputs need to be explicitly selected and manipulated to identify objects. Sec-
ond, reliable predictions seem not enough to select a way of (re-)identifying objects that
is unique. Actually, this seems also true for our perceptual system. As some Gestaltists
have tried to demonstrate, there are various alternative ways in which the visual system
may arrange and organize into a coherent image a single perceptual experience.
Which possibility remains for the physicists, or, more generally, for those who start
from data? Here we will explore the idea that objects (and properties) are conventionally
built. Again, this is not a new idea. Russell [20] claims that physics considers the series
of data which obey the law of physics and the things that render all sense-data calcula-
ble from a sufficient collection of data. Goodman [8] suggests that the re-identification
of physical objects relies on the re-identification of qualia that, ultimately, is a matter
of decrees, the result of some (conventional) choices. Quine [18] talks of posits, ob-
jects just built for convenience: “As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual
scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of
past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as conve-
nient intermediaries—not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible
posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer” ([18], p.44). This move
raises an additional question. If the physical world is conventional, what is the difference
5In this case, the segmentation of the output into sub-outputs relative to single objects must be considered.
with respect to the social world? The social world too is governed by laws that allow for
prediction and objects have a conventional nature and a coordination role.
Our first goal will be to make explicit the general mechanism used to build objects
from the outcomes of apparatuses, emphasizing what are the ontological and represen-
tational problems this construction faces. A second contribution will be a preliminary
discussion of some possible ways to distinguish social objects from physical ones (see
Section 4). A third contribution will be an attempt to create some links between two
scientific communities that rarely seek contact or mutual recognition: that of formal on-
tologies and that of formal concept analysis. In the following we will try to apply the
theoretical tools of both traditions in order to approach the questions listed above.
1. Formal concept analysis and outcomes of apparatuses
Our main objective is to investigate alternative ways of building objects from obser-
vations—from the descriptions of the outcomes of the apparatuses one disposes of6—
making explicit the conventions on which this construction is based. Some of these con-
ventions are necessary to allow the inter-subjective sharing and communication of obser-
vations, their diachronic comparison, etc. With respect to measurement instruments, they
consist in establishing reference standards, units of measurement, calibration and opera-
tional procedures, etc. These aspects are discussed in detail in [13]. Here we focus only
on the conventions necessary to build objects from observations that are then assumed as
inter-subjective, sharable, and shared. This means that if observations are represented as
rows in a table where the columns are (multi-valued) attributes of the outcomes of some
apparatus—a quite natural choice indeed—then we assume that the ‘meaning’ of these
attributes and their values is already established, allowing observations taken at different
times or by different apparatuses to be compared, while maintaining the perspective on
the out there from the standpoint of given types of apparatuses.
The idea of representing observations as rows characterized by attributes evokes
the formal concept analysis (FCA), a field in applied mathematics, started by Wille,
with the goal of precisely defining the notions of concept and conceptual hierarchy to
apply mathematical methods to conceptual data analysis and knowledge processing [7].
Because of our focus on the re-identification through time, we will also consider the
temporal concept analysis, an extension of FCA introduced by Wolff in [26,27].7
A formal context 〈O, A, IN〉 consists of a set of (formal) objects O , a set of (formal)
attributes A, and an incidence relation IN between O and A: 〈o, a〉 ∈ IN can be read as
“the object o has the attribute a”. A formal concept of the context 〈O, A, IN〉 is a pair
〈E, I 〉 with E ⊆ O, I ⊆ A, E ′ = I, I ′ = E , where E ′ = {a ∈ A | 〈o, a〉 ∈ IN for
all o ∈ E} and I ′ = {o ∈ O | 〈o, a〉 ∈ IN for all a ∈ I }. E is called the extent and I
the intent of the concept 〈E, I 〉. A formal concept 〈E, I 〉 abstracts from single objects
by collecting in E all the objects possessing all the attributes in I . Table 1.a illustrates a
formal context with O = {o1, o2, o3, o4}, A = {t1, t2, t3, t4, 1, 2, B}, where ‘×’ indicates
the IN relation, e.g. 〈o1, t1〉 ∈ IN. In this example, 〈{o1, o3}, {1, B}〉, 〈{o2, o4}, {2, B}〉,
and 〈{o1}, {t1, 1, B}〉 are formal concepts, but not 〈{o1, o2, o3}, {B}〉 or 〈{o1}, {t1}〉.
6Clear examples of apparatuses are measurement or perceptual systems. However, what follows can be easily
adapted, for instance, to systematic procedures to collect sociological or economical data.
7Where not explicitly noted, we will refer to [7] for the formal details.
Table 1. Some examples of formal contexts
t1 t2 t3 t4 1 2 B
o1 × × ×
o2 × × ×
o3 × × ×
o4 × × ×
tme pos col 1 2
o1 t1 1 B 
o2 t2 2 B 
o3 t3 1 B 
o4 t4 2 B 
tme pos col 1 2
o1 t1|t2 1 B 
o2 t1|t2 2 B
o3 t3|t4 1 B 
o4 t3|t4 2 B
(a) (b) (c)
A many-valued context 〈O, A, V, IN〉 consists of a set of objects O , a set of at-
tributes A, a set of values V , and an incidence relation IN between O , A, and V such
that 〈o, a, v〉 ∈ IN and 〈o, a, v′〉 ∈ IN then v = v′. We write a(o) = v instead of
〈o, a, v〉 ∈ IN for “the attribute a has the value v for the object o”. A many-valued con-
text can be translated in a (one-valued) formal context through scaling, i.e. by mapping
ranges of attribute values into a one-valued attribute. Finite many-valued contexts can
be translated into one-valued contexts without loss of information by assuming a plain
scale that separately maps each attribute value to a single attribute. The many-valued
context in Table 1.b, A = {tme, pos, col} and V = {t1, t2, t3, t4, 1, 2, B}, can be plainly
‘scaled’ into the one in Table 1.a (the last column can be omitted for the moment). We
will consider only finite many-valued contexts.
A conceptual time system (CTS) [26] on objects O consists of two (scaled) many-
valued contexts, a temporal one (the time part) and a non-temporal one (the event part)
both with the same objects O . The time part provides a complete temporal description of
objects in terms of time attributes here reduced to a unique one, tme, whose values refer
to an absolute clock.8 The event part contains all the other attributes. The states of the
outputs of the system can then be seen as the concepts of the non-temporal context. For
the sake of conciseness, temporal and non-temporal attributes are depicted in the same
table, where the last column graphically illustrates the states as, for instance, in Table 1.b.
In [26], the objects of CTSs are interchangeably called ‘time objects’, ‘time gran-
ules’, or ‘observations’, i.e. ‘elementary pieces of time’, ‘time instants’ during which
some measurement has taken place. This is partially motivated by the fact that objects
are individuated by the temporal context, i.e. we have a single output at a given time, the
complete output of the system. To avoid misunderstandings, we will use the term object
to indicate the entities built from observations, e.g. common sense, physical, or percep-
tual objects. In the perspective of describing the outputs of apparatuses, the objects of
CTSs will be called outputs or observations—even though observations are, more pre-
cisely, the descriptions of the outputs–while the values of the tme attribute will be called
times. These choices reflect some underlying ontological assumptions.
First, the outputs snap the out there by an apparatus at a time9, but they are neither
times nor ontological properties of objects. Different apparatuses can collect information
simultaneously and the temporal context allows outputs coming from different appara-
tuses to be synchronized or ordered (if times are ordered, see below). Furthermore, out-
puts say how, at a time, a part of the out there looks like through the apparatus, and in
this sense they are similar to qualia [8].
Second, non-plain temporal scales can group times together. The context in Table 1.c
is obtained from the one in Table 1.b by mapping both t1 and t2 to t1|t2 and both t3 and t4
8We cannot enter here into the huge problem of time construction.
9Therefore, outputs (observations) are dependent on a time and an apparatus.
to t3|t4 (plainly scaling the non-temporal part). We obtain different outputs with the same
non-instantaneous tme-values. What is the state of the system at time t1|t2? In the exam-
ple in Table 1.c states can be consistently reconstructed as depicted in the last column,
by assuming that o1 and o2 are just parts of the complete output. But what happens if
pos(o1) = pos(o2) but col(o1) 6= col(o2)? This can be problematic in the aggregation of
outputs coming from different apparatuses, modeled by contexts that are locally consis-
tent but globally inconsistent. The solution to this problem, not addressed here, requires
drastic losses of data or a lot of additional information about the apparatuses.
Third, in the attempt to build objects from observations one could have the necessity
to refer to a part of the output. The output of a camera could concern a multitude of
objects. One needs to segment it to individuate the specific ‘pixels’ that refer to a single
object. We will come back to this problem in Section 3.
Fourth, the values of attributes can be structured or have dependencies. This is infor-
mation about the apparatus that is not represented in the formal context. If we say that the
output o1 in Table 1.b represents the detection of black at position 1, we are assuming a
dependence between the values of pos and col. Goodman [8] would say that, in o1, 1 and
B (and t1) are together and pos identifies the portions of the ‘visual-field’ of the appara-
tus. The physical structure of the sensor or its orientation can be explicitly taken into ac-
count by some relations among pos-values. The conventional structure of measures, e.g.
the order between times and weights or the color splinter, can be represented in a similar
way. We will see how to represent this information and its role in specifying (i) the unity
criteria —to segment complex outputs in basic units linked to single objects—and (i i)
the re-identification criteria—to individuate one single object at different times.
2. The construction of objects
Consider the observations in Table 1.b. Which objects can be built from them? On the ba-
sis of which criteria? In [27], Wolff seems to think that it is a matter of choice. Goodman
would probably say that it is a matter of decrees. Objects help us in explaining our ba-
sic observations—what we know about the out there—and, in general, there are alterna-
tive coherent explanations. Technically, Wolff proceeds in the following way. (i) He la-
bels each observation with an ‘object name’, obtaining the couples 〈object, observation〉
called actual objects, sort of temporal slices of objects [24]. (i i) He builds the life tracks
of objects by temporally ordering the actual objects using the genidentity relation R:
〈obj1, obs1〉R〈obj2, obs2〉 iff obj1 = obj2 and obs1 < obs2, where ‘<’ is a temporal order
between observations.10 In Wolff’s words: “[given a (scaled) many-valued context S] one
has to construct a ‘conceptually meaningful’ genidentity R leading to ‘meaningful’ di-
rected paths in the transition digraph of the basic [system] (S,R). These direct paths are
then taken as the new objects, and the ‘nodes’ on these paths are interpreted as its ‘actual
objects”’ ([27], p.7). Coming back to our example, from the observations in Table 1.b
different objects can be built: a single object switching from position 1 to position 2;11
two static objects;12 four instantaneous objects; etc. This example is isomorphic to the
classical one of the morning/evening star [5] as described in [26] where 1 is the east, 2 is
10The relation< among observations can be induced by an order among the values of the temporal attributes.
11We have the four actual objects 〈obj1, o1〉, 〈obj1, o2〉, 〈obj1, o3〉, 〈obj1, o4〉.
12We have the four actual objects 〈obj1, o1〉, 〈obj2, o2〉, 〈obj1, o3〉, 〈obj2, o4〉.
the west, B is luminous, t1 and t3 are in the morning while t2 and t4 are in the evening. If
the observer knows only the data in Table 1.b, all the previous constructions are perfectly
coherent. To understand that the morning star is the same as the evening star, keeping
only the context with one object, additional information is needed.
This approach is general and simple but, from the perspective of object construction,
it has some drawbacks. First, the criteria adopted to build objects—why, for instance,
one should choose one object rather than two—are not explicit. This prevents one to
distinguish kinds of objects on the basis of their identity criteria, on the basis of the way
observations are grouped. Notice that the grouping via formal concepts is not enough. For
example, complex patterns of observations that, to be specified, have to take into account
the way an attribute changes with respect to another (e.g., the way col or pos ‘change
through’ tme) cannot be, in general, captured with concepts. Second, the approach in [27]
does not allow to manage observations of multiple objects, like camera outputs, that must
be segmented to be associated to single objects. We consider this problem in Section 3
while, to address the first one, we introduce the grouping criteria.
A grouping criterion γ is a set of sets of sets of attributes of a given formal con-
text. The elements of γ are called basic constraints. Grouping criteria specify patterns of
observations in a disjunctive normal form. In particular, they are a disjunction of basic
constraints that, in turn, are conjunctions of attribute ascriptions.13 E.g., in the context in
Table 1.a, γ1= {{{1,B}, {1,B}}, {{2,B}, {2,B}}} specifies the patterns of (exactly) two
observations both with attributes 1 and B (the first basic constraint {{1,B}, {1,B}}) or
both with attributes 2 and B (the second basic constraint {{2,B}, {2,B}}).
Given a grouping criterion γ, the set of γ-patterns (piγ) is the set of all sets of obser-
vations (in the given context) that satisfy at least one basic constraint in γ, i.e.:
piγ={{o1, . . . , on} | all oi are different and there exists a constraint {c1, . . . , cn}∈γ s.t.
for all oi there exists cj such that, for all a ∈ cj , 〈oi , a〉 ∈ IN, and
for all cj there exists oi such that, for all a ∈ cj , 〈oi , a〉 ∈ IN}
For instance, in the context in Table 1.a, piγ1 = {{o1, o3}, {o2, o4}}. The criterion γ2 ={{{t1,1},{t2,2}},{{t1,2},{t2,1}},{{t2,1},{t3,2}},{{t2,2},{t3,1}},{{t3,1},{t4,2}},{{t3,2},{t4,1}}}
specifies patterns of two observations with different positions and contiguous times. Ap-
plied to the context in Table 1.a, γ2 generates piγ2 = {{o1, o2}, {o2, o3}, {o3, o4}}.
The last example shows that γ-patterns can overlap. Consequently, the same ob-
servation can be a member of, can support, a multitude of different patterns. Group-
ing criteria can also generate patterns that are included one in the other. For instance,
γ3= {{{1,B}}, {{1,B}, {1,B}}, {{1,B}, {1,B}, {1,B}}}, in the context in Table 1.a, gen-
erates piγ3 = {{o1}, {o3}, {o1, o3}} that, in addition, does not cover the whole set of ob-
servations. Therefore, observations are not necessarily partitioned by patterns.
Grouping criteria can be seen as ‘extensional’ (in terms of the attributes the obser-
vations need to have) specifications of constraints that concern observations’ attributes:
γ1 corresponds to col(o1) = col(o2) = B and pos(o1) = pos(o2); γ2 corresponds to
pos(o1) 6= pos(o2) and tme(o1)l tme(o2) assuming times are ordered by< and xl y iff
x < y∧¬∃z(x < z∧z < y).14 In our framework, chains—patterns that have a maximal,
not specifiable a priori, length—can be built relying on a (recursive) closure operator on
13We do not consider negative conjuncts. However, the framework can be extended to take them into account.
14In principle, given a formal context, it is possible to generate the grouping criteria starting from the con-
straints expressed in this intensional form.
Table 2. Different changes in color and position
tme pos col 1 2 3
o1 t1 1 B 
o2 t2 2 B 
o3 t3 3 G 
o4 t4 3 G 
tme pos col 1 2 3
o1 t1 1 B 
o2 t2 1 B 
o3 t3 3 G 
o4 t4 3 G 
(a) (b)
piγ, a sort of generalization of the transitive closure: if p1, p2 ∈ piγ and p1∩ p2 6= ∅, then
delete p1 and p2 from piγ and introduce in it p1 ∪ p2. We will note with p¯iγ the closure of
piγ. For instance, p¯iγ2 = {{o1, o2, o3, o4}} contains only one chain of black observations
with different positions at contiguous times, and p¯iγ3 ={{o1, o3}} contains only one chain
of black observations with position 1.
Different grouping criteria can generate the same patterns. E.g., in the context in
Table 2.b, γ4={{{1},{1}}, {{2},{2}}, {{3},{3}}} (corresponding to pos(o1)=pos(o2)) and
γ5 = {{{B},{B}}, {{G},{G}}} (corresponding to col(o1) = col(o2)) both generate piγ4 =
piγ5 = {{o1, o2}, {o3, o4}}. We have again observations that support different patterns, but
now these patterns are generated by different criteria.
We use grouping criteria to group observations into objects. In particular, we dis-
tinguish synchronic criteria, called unity criteria and noted γu (see Section 3), that col-
lect observations having the same temporal attribute, and diachronic criteria, called re-
identification criteria and noted γr, that collect observations having different temporal
attributes, e.g., γ2. For instance, by modifying γ4 and γ5 accepting only patterns with
contiguous times15 and closing them, we re-identify objects on the basis of the position
(γr4 ) or the color (γ
r
5 ). Applying these new criteria to the context in Table 2.b we obtain
piγ4 = piγ5 = p¯iγr4 = p¯iγr5 . Notice that this is only a factual situation: by applying γr4 and
γr5 to the context in Table 2.a, we obtain p¯iγr4 = {{o3, o4}} 6= p¯iγr5 = piγ5.
Similarly as for formal concepts, an object kind k seems to have an intensional
component—the re-identification criterion γrk —and an extensional component—the pat-
terns (chains) in piγrk (p¯iγrk ). In this view, objects are not reducible to patterns or chains,
but, following a sort of constructivist (in a logical sense) approach, the building mecha-
nism, the re-identification criterion, has to be considered as a ‘part’ of objects.16 A kind
k of objects (in a formal context) is then a couple 〈piγrk , γrk 〉, piγrk is the extent and γrk the
intent of k. The same holds if we consider the closure.17 In this way k4 6= k5 even though
p¯iγr4 = p¯iγr5 because γr4 6= γr5 , i.e., the patterns are generated by different grouping criteria
that, typically, are founded in the theory behind the instruments or in the way observers
‘interpret’ the observations. Objects of kind k, k-objects, have then to take into account
the intensional part. We will represent them as couples 〈x, k〉 where k is a kind with re-
identification criterion γrk and x ∈ piγrk (or p¯iγrk ). Considering the previous γr4 and γr5 , even
in the context in Table 2.a, we can now distinguish 〈{o1, o2}, k4〉 from 〈{o1, o2}, k5〉. In
this way, it is possible to address the classical ontological problem of material constitu-
15By substituting the first basic constraint in γ4 (similarly for the other cases) with the three basic constraints
{{t1, 1}, {t2, 1}}, {{t2, 1}, {t3, 1}}, {{t3, 1}, {t4, 1}}.
16In [21], Scheider and colleagues follow a similar approach in a perceptive context. However, it is not clear
to us how the intensional dimension of objects is captured, and only the private dimension is considered.
17Note that the closure operator contributes to the identity of the kind.
Table 3. Segmentation of observations
tme pos col 1 2 3
o1 t1 1 B 
o2 t2 2 G 
o3 t3 3 
o4 t4 1 
o5 t5 2 B 
o6 t6 3 G 
tme colp1 colp2 colp3 1 2 3
o¯1 t3 B G 
o¯2 t6 B G 
tme colp1 colp2 colp3 1 2 3
o¯11 t3 B 
o¯12 t3 G 
o¯21 t6 B 
o¯22 t6 G 
(a) (b) (c)
tion (see [19] for a review), the idea that (at a given time) objects of different kind can
coincide, e.g., a statue and the amount of clay that constitutes it.18
3. Segmentation and unity criteria
Let us now suppose to have at our disposal two structurally different apparatuses, cal-
ibrated with respect to time (tme) and color (col) attributes. The first apparatus has an
orientable (in three different directions) one-pixel sensor that is very quick in detect-
ing black or gray shades of color. The second apparatus has a slower (non-orientable)
three-pixels sensor. The two sensors are simultaneously turned on. The first sensor se-
quentially detects the colors at its orientations (represented by pos-values), producing six
outputs from t1 to t6, see Table 3.a. The second sensor produces two outputs, at t3 and
t6, that however regard the colors detected by three different pixels, see Table 3.b. Re-
identification criteria can generate up to 15 objects in the first case but only 3 in the sec-
ond case. In particular, from the data in Table 3.b, one can construct only bi-colored ob-
jects because data cannot be segmented,19 objects cannot be built starting from relevant
parts of observations (called partial observations).20
Partial observations are built first by decomposing observations in atomic parts and
then by grouping them according to unity criteria.An observation o j is an atomic part
of oi if and only if (1) tme(o j ) = tme(oi ) and (2) there exists a non temporal attribute
att (att 6= tme) with att(oi ) 6= ∅ (∅ is the undefined value) such that att(o j ) = att(oi )
and for all non-temporal attributes att′ 6= att we have att′(o j ) = ∅.21 The atomic parts
of the observations in Table 3.b are reported in Table 3.c. We can then use unity crite-
ria γu to group synchronous atomic observations—observations with the same temporal
attribute—into partial ones. In general, unity criteria take into account some information
about the apparatus and/or the observer—his/her intended interpretation of data.22
18At time t , a k1-object x coincides with a k2-object y, if there exists an observation belonging to both the
observations grouped in x and the ones grouped in y with temporal attribute t .
19Vice versa, the observations in Table 3.a can be grouped by scaling sequences of three successive times in
a single one, e.g. t1, t2, and t3 are scaled in t1|t2|t3 (see Table 1.c).
20Segmentation algorithms are central in computer vision, see [2], that contains also a useful overview.
21This definition works only when all attributes are independent. If, for instance, the attribute col in Table 3.a
is together (in Goodman’s sense) with pos—i.e. colors are ‘positioned’—then atomic observations oi with
col(oi ) 6= ∅ and pos(oi ) = ∅ satisfy the definition but not the dependence (while the ones with col(oi ) = ∅
and pos(oi ) 6= ∅ still make sense). A more complex definition is needed to take into account dependencies.
22It is also possible to layer unity criteria. For instance, uniformly colored areas of a picture can be built by
grouping self-connected sets of pixels with the same color, and uniformly colored areas can, on their turn, be
grouped in some complex patterns on the basis of some additional criteria. We do not address this topic here.
Let us consider the criterion (Xi stands for “the value of the attribute colpi is X”)
γu1 ={{{t3,B1}, {t3,G2}}, {{t3,G1}, {t3,B2}}, {{t3,B2}, {t3,G3}}, {{t3,G2}, {t3,B3}}, . . .}
that corresponds to the constraint: there exists n such that colpn (o1) 6=∅, colpn+1(o2) 6=∅,
colpn (o1) 6= colpn+1(o2), and tme(o1) = tme(o2), i.e., we are here grouping atomic
observations with adjacent non uniformly colored pixels (supposing pixels are discrete
and ordered). In the context in Table 3.c, γu1 generates piγu1 = {{o¯11, o¯12}, {o¯21, o¯22}}.
The unity criterion that corresponds to the constraint colpn (o1) 6= ∅, colpn+1(o2) 6= ∅,
colpn (o1) = colpn+1(o2), and tme(o1) = tme(o2), does not generate any pattern, and o¯1
and o¯2 are not segmented, because no adjacent pixels with uniform color exist.
As in the case of re-identification criteria, different unity criteria may generate the
same patterns. Partial observations23 have then to explicitly refer to the unity criteria
that generated them. In the previous case, we end up with two partial observations:
〈{o¯11, o¯12}, γu1 〉 and 〈{o¯21, o¯22}, γu1 〉. Note that these partial observations are different
from the initial observations o¯1 and o¯2 because their unity criterion is not based on time,
as it is implicitly the case of the original ones instead.24
At this point, re-identification criteria can be used to group partial observations in-
stead of complete ones. The intent of a kind k has then two components: a unity crite-
rion γuk and a re-identification criterion γ
r
k . The criterion γ
u
k groups synchronic atomic
observations, while γrk groups diachronic partial observations all generated by γ
u
k , i.e.
only partial observations uniformly built can be grouped to form an object. The previous
definition (see Section 2) of a kind k needs then to be extended: k = 〈Ek, γuk , γrk 〉 where
Ek is the extent of k, the set of patterns generated by applying γrk to the set of partial
observations generated by applying γuk to the set of the atomic observations of a given
context. We can then define object systems. An object system 〈θ, K 〉 consists of a CTS θ
and a finite set K of object kinds on θ .
3.1. No observation, no object?
In our account no object can obtain independently from our constructions and observa-
tions. However, science often refers to things that were long before human species ap-
peared, or to things that will be long after humans will be gone. How can such things
be the result of construction and observation? Boghossian exemplifies a common line
of attack from the realist’s camp: “[T]here were mountains on earth well before there
were humans. How, then, could we be said to have constructed the fact that there are
mountains on earth?” ([1], p. 26).
First, notice that the kind of constructivism we are subscribing to does not necessar-
ily imply anti-realism, because we aim at being tuned with the out there. The observa-
tions (partially) depend on instruments that point to the out there, and objects and laws
depend on observations.
Second, it is not necessary to assume that k-objects are put into existence when the
identity (unity and re-identification) criteria of k are introduced, i.e. when the ‘concept’
23Partial observations include also whole observations as limit cases.
24Original observations can be seen as patterns generated by grouping all synchronous atomic observations,
i.e. the unity criterion takes into account only the temporal attribute.
k is created or explicitly considered.25 If one disposes of observations collected before
the introduction of k, still one could find k-objects in them.26
‘Incomplete observation’ is more problematic. Suppose that, from t0 to tn , we col-
lected a set of observations with the same apparatus and that, according to our criteria,
objects of kind k are identified only between ti and tn (with t0 < ti ). One could infer that
k-objects come into existence at ti , as in the case of k = ‘Airbus A380’ and ti = ‘April
27, 2005’. But the position that assumes that k-objects are discovered at ti —they already
existed, but the instrument was pointing in the wrong direction—cannot be ruled out. For
the same reason, if k is introduced at t0, it is not possible to claim that no k-objects exist
between t0 and ti , we just did not observe them. For instance, Neptune has been found
by mathematical prediction and successively observed on September 23, 1846 by Johann
Galle, but nobody claims that in August 1846 Neptune was not present. More drastically,
did Neptune exist before the first telescope was invented? This is a general problem the
constructivist (instrumentalist) faces: “no observation, no object”.
A partial way out considers prediction and retrodiction laws. One predicts (or retro-
dicts) what would be the outputs of instruments at different times or ‘aimings’—the ex-
pected observations—given the actual observations collected by them. The expected ob-
servations are the result of the application of laws to the actual ones. While identity cri-
teria produce objects—convenient intermediaries, in Quine’s words—that help our un-
derstanding and interpretation of observations, laws27 produce new observations, they
add ‘expectations’ about the out there by projecting observations into observations. This
mechanism allows to ‘virtually’ use the instrument also before its creation (or in the fu-
ture) and to ‘virtually’ point it in a given direction. We are here capturing a sort of modal
reasoning regulated by laws. A kind k comes into existence at t iff, at t , there exist some
k-objects but no k-object can be built from any retrojection. However, the revision of
laws or the acquisition of new data could impact on the retrojections and consequently
change the time of appearance of k-objects. Therefore, the existence of k-objects at time
t does not require any observation at t , but, in any case, it depends on the laws and on
the actual data one possesses at a given time. This can be seen as a form of fallibilism,
still at center of a lively debate.
4. Social objects in a constructed realm
The common conception is that social reality is something constructed par excellence.
More than this, often the slogan “if you construct it, it is social, if it is given, then it is
not” is assumed. Realists, e.g. [23], endorse such a slogan with some kind of ease, but
in our approach also non social objects are built. Moreover, for standard accounts, to
have a social object means to have a plurality of agents accepting something as being the
case. But, as we have seen, in our account the identifiability of ‘regular’ objects relies on
some sort of conventionalism too. Finally, social objects are usually intended as means to
achieve some sort of coordination. But, again, this seems to hold also for some non social
25Our framework can be easily extended to account for this.
26One can also assume that the identity criteria associated to k evolve in time, i.e. they can be only applied
to observations collected during a specific interval of time. We will not deal with this important topic.
27Also laws are constructed, they are part of a theory which is built to make sense of the observations. To
cope with prediction/retrodiction laws and the way they are built, our framework needs to be heavily extended.
Table 4. A chess game?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
(a) (b)
objects, since they can be the products of (public) decrees or perceptive mechanisms
used within a community of agents—who share similar ‘sensors’, as the members of our
species—and they are used to coordinate with the out there and among each other. How,
then, to tell the difference between what is social and what is not?
A first answer could be based on identity criteria: for social objects they seem to be
more elusive than those of other ordinary objects, as the physical ones. The difference
here is more a matter of degrees than of kind: social objects seem to be more ‘abstract’
or ‘physically pliable’. A basketball team, for example, can change in a meaningful and
continuous way through time: players, coaches, sometimes even city. But their behavior
in time is not the only peculiarity of social objects. A collection of paintings, such as the
British Royal Collection, can be scattered, located in different places, such as Windsor
Castle, Buckingham Palace and Hampton Court Palace, at the same time.
Let’s try to make sense of such more relaxed degrees of freedom in light of the just
presented framework. Consider a 8 × 8 grid sensor that detects which positions of the
grid are occupied. The states at t0 and t1 are depicted in Tables 4.a-b respectively. Could
we say that there are objects positioned on the grid and that one of them moved between
t0 and t1? Suppose now the sensor is declared to point to a chessboard. Chess players
could now say that there are 4 rooks, 4 knights, etc. and that a white pawn moved. This
amounts to say that the re-identification of chess pieces, in addition to rules for moving
them, is based on their starting positions on the chessboard.
Suppose now that during a chess game the figurine used as white queen is lost and
the players decide to substitute it with a pebble, relying on the pliability of chess pieces—
they can survive a change in shape, material, color etc. without loosing their own identity.
If someone is observing the game by only looking at the mentioned 8 × 8 grid sensor,
still she is able to track the white queen as well as the other pieces. This is not only
because the sensor’s output is interpreted using chess rules, but also because the sensor
cannot detect the difference between the figurine and the pebble, being it just able to
discriminate on the basis of positions and not of shapes or colors.
By disposing of a better sensor that detects also shapes or other physical attributes,
to re-identify the white queen—but not the figurine or the pebble—the observer has
to abstract from them. In addition, at the beginning the white queen coincides (in the
sense introduced in Section 2) with the figurine, while at the end, with the pebble.28 The
pebble (and the figurine) is pliable in a different sense, it can play different roles or it
can constitute different entities at different times. For example, the pebble used for the
queen can be also used, in a different phase of the game, for a rook. Therefore, queens
seem physically more pliable than figurines or pebbles, they are weakly linked to their
28Note that the figurine and the pebble are not queens, i.e. the kind ‘queen’ does not subsume the kinds
‘figurine’ and ‘pebble’. Following [4], the queen could be seen as a sum of two different qua-objects, one
inhering in the figurine and the other one inhering in the pebble.
physical substratum. Vice versa, figurines and pebbles can be used in different contexts
but are physically stable.
Another characteristic of social objects is their intentional dimension. Not only so-
cial objects get necessarily into existence at a given time (see Section 3.1)—for instance
when a declarative, institutional act is performed—but they are created with some pur-
pose in mind. The intentional dimension can then be represented as a selection of the ex-
pected observations, called intended observations. These are the observations intended to
be produced, from the actual ones, by ‘using’ the social object. Since we are constrained
by physical laws, our purposes are realizable only if they are compatible with them, i.e.
the intended observations need to be included in the expected observations of physics.
In this view, social objects can be seen as ways of ‘exploiting’ (our knowledge of)
the out there to achieve a goal. For example, chess can be seen as a complex object that,
through some rules, exploits figurines and boards to allow two persons to play a game.
Once we have the purpose of chess, after the game, a possible mismatch between the
intended observations and the current ones, can be interpreted in different ways: (1) chess
is wrong by design as the intended observations are not physically realizable, e.g. rules
are contradictory or impossible to follow for humans; (2) the design is underspecified, it
guarantees to achieve the goal only in some cases, e.g. rules do not constrain the moves
enough; (3) there is a ‘malfunctioning’, the design is correct but the particular physical
realization does not satisfy the specifications, e.g. figurines for queens are missing; (4)
there is a ‘misuse’, the design is correct but the particular ‘users’ behavior does not
satisfy the specifications, e.g. the players do not follow the rules. The mismatch requires
a change of the design in the first case29, while in the second one there is at least a partial
fulfillment of the goal that can motivate a change, but not necessarily.
Assume that an alien, say E.T., has access to the very same observations as Yuri, a
chess champion. Differently from Yuri, E.T has no knowledge of the intended goal and
of the design of chess. By means of induction, E.T. can find patterns of regularity in
data and come up with some prediction’s laws. When he finds some mismatches between
the newly acquired observations and the projections generated by his laws, he can only
conclude that his laws are wrong and need to be revised. This situation seems close to the
one described by Searle in [22], where a detective writes down the items a man selects
according to his shopping list. At the end of the day, both shopper and detective have
identical lists. However, their function is different, they have different directions of fit.
As in the case of E.T.’s prediction laws, the detective’s list, but not the shopper’s, has to
fit the world by matching the observations of the shopper’s actions.
5. Conclusions
Constructivism, as we intend it, is an attempt to understand what is out there without
relying on the naive illusion that the veil will be one day teared away. We extended some
tools imported from FCA to make explicit how objects can be (re-)identified from obser-
vations, making a clear distinction between their extensional and intensional dimensions.
In addition, we analyzed how our framework can be extended—with projections, laws,
and intentionality—to distinguish, among constructed objects, social objects.
29These mismatches can also provide evidences that the assumed physical laws are wrong.
The possible applications of this approach may span a wide variety of directions:
from the identification of the entities the web data refer to, to enhancement of algorithms
for the tracking of objects in computer vision systems, to the use of formal methods for
object recognition in cognitive sciences.
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